

According to tradition the self-proclaimed “sophist” (DL 2.65: οὔτος σοφιστεύσας; Arist. *Met.* 3.996a32) was apparently the first to *get* a payment from his pupils and the first to *offer* payment to Socrates who, unsurprisingly, kindly refused (DL 2.72). As with the sophists, quite a few of the evidence or anecdotes surrounding Aristippus deal with the question of education – an expected topic which is the starting point of Aristippus’ conversation with Socrates in Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.1. As a fellow disciple, Aristippus was an acquaintance of Antisthenes whom he mocked for his constant moroseness (*Suda*, s.v. Aristippus = SSR IV A 19: ἐπέσκωπτε στρυφνότητα); he too was an enemy of Plato (DL 6.36: φιλέχθρως; SSR IV A 15-18);⁶⁹ and he was hated by Xenophon (DL 2.65: δυσμενῶς). Mocked by Plato and Timon for being quite the luxurious and effeminate dandy (DL 2.66-69), Aristippus certainly does not bear the mark of frugality that distinguishes Socrates and Diogenes⁷⁰ but similarly to the latter, his tradition is mainly “chreiotic” and is characterized by quirky anecdotes that usually gear up towards witty remarks.⁷¹

Parallel to the Antisthenean strand of tradition, Aristippus too is connected to Diogenes through some anecdotes,⁷² and his reply to Diogenes’ mockery (ἔσκωψε) in DL

⁶⁹ His conspicuous absence from Plato’s dialogues suggests the same kind of silent treatment that is given to Antisthenes. He is only mentioned once to note his absence at Socrates’ deathbed, because he was on the island of Aegina, just a few miles from Athens (*Phd.* 59c).

⁷⁰ Still, Aristippus put a limit to pleasure, thus following the major trend of 4th-c. ethics (DL 2.71): “Just as those who eat most and who exercise are not in better health than those who eat just as much as is sufficient (τὰ δέοντα), so too those who know many things but not what is useful (χρήσιμα) are not excellent men (σπουδαῖοι)”.

⁷¹ He seemed to be fond of puns too: “I went to Socrates because I wanted instruction (παιδείας), and I have come to Dionysius because I want diversion (παιδιᾶς)” (DL 2.80).

⁷² As with Antisthenes, personal contacts between Diogenes and Aristippus are probably entirely fictional and are, actually, even less credible since it is assumed that Aristippus returned to Cyrene where he eventually died in the 350s, just around the time Diogenes made it to Athens (*contra* Moles 1996). I can accept a historical rivalry between the two men *only insofar* as Diogenes engaged with ideas that were hallmarks of Aristippus’ thoughts: “there is a certain relationship between their philosophical systems and... Diogenes certainly criticized Aristippus” (Moles 1996.109, n.19 on scholarly interest in their relationship). Diogenes would have been acquainted with Aristippus’ views through his writings or even his

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I stand by my reply to Poulakos’s response, in which I agreed with his critique of objectivist historiography while distancing myself from such a position (“History and Neo-Sophistic Criticism”). My point then was one that I have revisited a number of times in the intervening twenty-five years: We can accept that “facts” are theory-bound and socially/rhetorically constituted while still insisting on the value of a genre of writing we call “history.” Indeed, Havelock, Holland, and Segal say much the same thing (Schiappa, “History and Neo-Sophistic Criticism”). When I published an essay the following year in this journal questioning the historical basis for the concept of “sophistic rhetoric,” I spent nearly half the essay defending a neopragmatist account of historiography, one that fully acknowledges the partiality of historical interpretation and the constructedness of facts (“Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage”).

The challenges concerning the status of “facts” and interpretive validity that Poulakos articulated were issues that animated academic battles in the 1990s over the implications of “postmodernism,” however one wishes to define the term. At various points in that decade, I found myself caught in the crossfire between two extreme “sides” of the debate, most interestingly illustrated by the fact that I was likened to a Holocaust Denier by a theoretically “liberal” scholar (Victor Vitanza) and a theoretically “conservative” scholar (Rainer Friedrich).

In his *Negation, Subjectivity, and the History of Rhetoric*, Vitanza describes me as a traditional-modernist-philological-‘metaphysical’ formalist, as well as a part-time Platonist and Aristotelian (32–34). Invoking Lyotard’s notion of a *differend* and his critique of the rules of evidence that characterize litigation, Vitanza compares my historical arguments for considering the construct “sophistic rhetoric” problematic to Holocaust revisionists who claim that no reliable evidence exists that the Holocaust happened. Because I question the coherence of the genus “sophist,” I commit a form of genocide (Genus-cide) that seeks the extermination of “the sophists” (“Sophist-cide”): “Schiappa is engaging in a very violent and potentially dangerous and pernicious *differend*. Schiappa’s thinking is much like the contemporary historians’ thinking who would deny—given the rules of evidence in the courtroom—the less-than-factual testimony of the holocaust survivors” (45).

Classicist and critic of postmodernism Rainer Friedrich traveled a different road but reached a similar destination. Friedrich was responding not to my published work but to a reviewer's description in the *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* of my account of how facts are socially constructed.⁶ See John Michael Crafton's review of *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece* (*Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 2001.03.09), followed by Rainer Friedrich's response and my reply, all of which are accessible online at: <http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcr/>. View all notes In the same article that Vitanza critiques, I use the example of the statement that "JFK was killed in 1963" as an example of a reliable fact that was nonetheless socially constructed and could, in theory, be revised someday as our conceptualizations of time, identity, and mortality evolve. In the book version of the essay, I noted that "rejecting the statement 'JFK died in 1881' does not make me a traditionalist, positivist, objectivist, foundationalist who labors under the delusion that I have access to objective and uninterpreted facts" (*The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory* 60). Friedrich likes these labels and is appalled that I would distance myself from them:

Let me use an untrivial example. If I reject as false, on the strength of cogent evidence, the assertion that the Nazi genocide of the European Jewry in the early forties of the 20th century did not happen, and am therefore branded as a "traditionalist, positivist, objectivist, foundationalist who labors under the delusion that I have access to objective and uninterpreted facts"—what would this branding of me amount to? It would amount to a subtle form of holocaust denial, and it would place my detractors in the most odious company!

It is unfortunate that Friedrich did not read the book he maligned, because in the next sentence I wrote, "It means that I can acknowledge the contingency, rhetoricity, and constructedness of those claims I treat as facts yet still believe them to be useful until persuaded to do otherwise," then noting that the price we pay for giving up facts altogether "is that we must give up history as well" (60–61).

Another noteworthy critic is Scott Consigny, who authored three publications discussing my work. As I have replied already at some length to the details of his critiques ("Protagoras" and "Some of My Best Friends"), I limit myself here to an admittedly oversimplified summary. Consigny's primary point of critique is to describe me as a "foundationalist" trying to produce a more "objective and accurate account of

the sophists” that is “radically different” from the accounts of my “neosophistic adversaries” (“Edward Schiappa’s Reading of the Sophists” 248–61). In reply, I argued that I am not a foundationalist, that I do not “oppose” neosophistic scholarship (indeed, I coined the term *neosophistic* to create the space for both historical reconstruction and contemporary “neosophistic” appropriation), and that Consigny had seriously misconstrued and distorted the point of much of my work. I suggested that Consigny’s narrative divided the intellectual world into two extremes—on one side is the “irrational, mythical-poetic, antifoundationalist culture of the sophists” summed up with the term *rhetoric*, and on the other is the “rationalistic, foundationalist, logocentric, scientific culture of Plato and Aristotle” summed up by Consigny with the term *philosophy*. Consigny accuses my account of Protagoras and Gorgias of trying to turn them into philosophers, while I contend that the point of my work on Protagoras and Gorgias is to challenge this very binary (“Some of My Best Friends” 274–75).

Nonetheless, I want to credit Consigny with the most nuanced analysis I have read concerning the constellation of contingent beliefs and practices involved in historical reconstruction, ranging from the constitution of specific texts (what *counts* as a Protagorean fragment, for example) to the dependence of translation practices on interpretation, and to the manner in which translations are, by definition, anachronistic(ish). Indeed, I believe the exchange we had in *Rhetoric Review* in 1996 might be more useful to graduate students than that with Poulakos. Nonetheless, I believe Consigny errs by making the inference that because historical reconstruction is always partial and contingent (and *hard*) that it is therefore impossible and implicitly not worth pursuing.

The concept with which I have tried to make sense of such disparate readings is *rhetorical salience*.⁷⁷ I discuss the idea of *rhetorical salience* with respect to the history of Greek rhetoric in Schiappa (*Protagoras and Logos* 206–12) and with respect to interpreting popular culture texts in Schiappa (*Beyond Representational Correctness* 61–85). View all notes When historians engage texts, we are looking for something, and what we are looking for, and what we *notice*, is guided by beliefs, interests, and value-commitments. These beliefs and interests create rhetorical salience for specific features of a text. For nineteenth-century pragmatists, for example, what was rhetorically salient about Protagoras was his explicit humanism, religious agnosticism, and his “objective relativism.” What was salient for me was how he took

Heraclitean insights and advanced new ways to explain and describe the world (*Protagorus and Logos*). Because our interests and beliefs are culturally and historically situated, there will be a periodic need to rewrite history. The difference between writing in a genre we call history and others is a value commitment to avoid anachronism and to understand, as best we can, how historical Others lived. Sometimes that is an important value commitment indeed, as the victims of the Holocaust remind us.

Part of the experience of rhetorical salience is how we value *similarity* and *difference*. Poulakos and Consigny are attracted to those aspects of “the sophists” (mostly Gorgias and Protagoras) that they find *similar* to their contemporary theoretical pieties; thus, Poulakos finds a Heideggerian streak in their texts, and Consigny finds fellow travelers of antifoundationalism. I think such contemporary appropriations can be insightful and valuable, and, indeed, in writing about Isocrates, I noted similarities between his vision of philosophia and contemporary Pragmatism (“Isocrates’ *Philosophia*”). However, the example of Isocrates also reminds us of the importance of valuing difference. What is strange, unfamiliar, or most different about an historical text is precisely what provides us the greatest opportunity to learn and experience something new. Accordingly, drawing from Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur, I have argued there is an analogy between engaging historical texts and ethical ways of engaging an Other (*The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory* 167–68). Just as “pure” access to the past is impossible, “pure” empathy and identification with someone radically “other” is impossible, but that does not mean we don’t make an effort. To treat Gorgias, Protagoras, Isocrates, and so forth, ethically and respectfully involves attending to their differences from us before we move to assimilating them into our categories.

2.68 is typical of his wit. When Diogenes, who was found washing vegetables at the time, said to Aristippus: “If you had learnt to eat these vegetables, you would not have been a slave in the palace of a tyrant. And you, replied Aristippus, if you had known how to behave among men (ἀνθρώποις ὁμιλεῖν), would not have been washing vegetables.”⁷³ The Chreia tradition also portrays Diogenes calling Aristippus “a royal dog” (2.66: βασιλικὸν κύνα), where the βασιλεύς referred to is Dionysius I, at whose court in Syracuse Aristippus got to sojourn for a while. What is clear from this anecdote is that Diogenes meant the nickname as an insult:⁷⁴ the image is one of submission to the tyrant. Diogenes the Dog, on the other hand, may have perceived himself as a *political dog* or a social watchdog rather than a simple domesticated pet.⁷⁵ But the context of the anecdote is significant: Diogenes called him a dog because Aristippus “savored the pleasure of what was at hand and did not toil at chasing the enjoyment of what was *not* present”.⁷⁶ As the anecdote shows the tradition thus portrays Diogenes as *verbally* mocking Aristippus for precisely the hedonistic *thought* Aristippus is known to have upheld: again, that is the precise nature of the Chreia tradition which is condemned to write the historiography of philosophy with and through biographical anecdotes. Despite some compatible ideals between the two, Cynicism greatly differs from Hedonism mainly from the “tameness” with which Diogenes’ radicalism contrasts and which is susceptible

apophthegms (DL 2.83-85: the catalogue of Aristippus’ literary production relies on the authority of Sotion and Panetius, while Sosicrates and others doubt that he wrote anything at all, exactly as in the case of Diogenes).

⁷³ The same anecdote opposing a Cynic and a Cyrenaic reappears one generation later with Metrocles and Theodorus as the characters (DL 6.102).

⁷⁴ By contrast, Diogenes is hailed as a “heavenly dog, born of Zeus” (οὐράνιος κύων) in Cercidas’ meliamb (DL 6.77), perhaps a deliberate contrast between Aristippus (or hedonistic views) and Diogenes (or later Cynic views). Diogenes’ own views on pleasure (DL 6.71) may engage those of the Hedonists, Aristippus’ pupils.

⁷⁵ DL 2.67: Strato, or Plato for others, said to Aristippus: “You are the only one to whom it is given to wear both the full cloak *and* rags (χλαμίδα φορεῖν καὶ ῥάκος)”.

⁷⁶ Cf. Simonides 584 PMG: “What mortal life or which tyranny is desirable without pleasure (ἄδονᾶς ἄτερ)? Without this, even the life of the gods is *enviable* [or *worth emulation*, ζηλωτός].”

to attack its victims. Case in point, Diogenes' doggishness is at the opposite of this "royal dog" who has a docile nature and for whom pleasures seem endless; the κυνικὸς τρόπος, whose anti-hedonistic view is epitomized in DL 6.71 – "even the contempt of pleasure itself (αὐτῆς τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡ καταφρόνησις) is most pleasurable (ἡδυνάτη)" – turns his practitioner into a snarling and biting dog, a wild creature angry at the world and mad at his contemporaries.

Regarding politics the relevant passages relating to Aristippus' ideas are found in Xenophon and DL: first, Aristippus reasoned against patriotism and he used to say that one's "country (πατρίδα) was the world (κόσμον)" (DL 2.98-99); and when pressed by Socrates during a conversation, he replied: "I do not confine (κατακλείω) myself to one political community (εἰς πολιτείαν), I am a foreigner everywhere (ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμι)" (Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.13-14).⁷⁷ It is a truism to say that most early sophists had been foreigners in Athens, just as Diogenes the Dog himself was, decades later. And so, orbiting around that group of individuals, Aristippus sees himself wearing the sophist's clothes, a traveling teacher, an eternal outsider, who discourses (λόγοι) on pleasure and is consequently always distant from direct political power.

But let us compare the formulations of Aristippus and Diogenes' sayings in order to see how they closely relate to one another. The message of Diogenes' apophthegm "I am a citizen of the world" (DL 6.63: κοσμοπολίτης) seems simple enough: Diogenes understands political and civic "belonging" in a wider sense than in claiming to be "a Sinopean", "an Athenian", etc. But from the anecdote as given in DL, there is a small

⁷⁷ I here analyze one side of Aristippus' claim, since the word ξένος is a popular *double-entendre*: Aristippus paradoxically states that he is at once a "guest" everywhere but also that he is a "host" everywhere. While connecting this apophthegm with Aristippus' stay in Syracuse, the former meaning "guest" works better although we must not exclude the other: the paradoxical nature of his wit would certainly have been intended by him.

problem with Diogenes' reply. The full quote in 6.63 runs as follows: ἐρωτηθεὶς πόθεν εἶη, “κοσμοπολίτης,” ἔφη. To the question “where he is *from*” Diogenes answers “[I am] a citizen of the world”. His neologism is more interesting (or even perplexing) than it might seem at first glance: as if the name was created on the model of places such as Amphipolis and Megalopolis (or names such as metropolis, acropolis, and the like), κοσμοπολίτης simply and literally means “*citizen of Cosmopolis*”. In his reply Diogenes thus jointly circumvents the actual question “where are you *from*?”⁷⁸ and claims citizenship to one political entity in “positive” terms.⁷⁹ Strictly speaking we can say that Diogenes is asserting that he is the citizen of a state, rather than of the whole world, as Diogenes could have easily formulated his thought as Κόσμου πολίτης (“a citizen of the *World*”) instead.⁸⁰ We are closer here to a utopian statement that reconfigures the geopolitical into something bigger: *Cosmopolis* is truly a κοσμο-πόλις, a *Universe-City*, it is a “true” community. As such Diogenes' saying that “the only true *constitution* (πολιτεία) is the one in the universe” (DL 6.72)⁸¹ is perfectly harmonized with his cosmopolitan formulation: the “only true political constitution” is that which embraces

⁷⁸ The answer begs for the city of Σινώπη, as his place of origin; otherwise the answer Σινώπεν might wrongly suggest to his interlocutor that he ‘inhabits’ the territory of Sinope. The whole idea of Cosmopolis also finds echo in Callipolis, the ideal city painted by Socrates in the *Republic* (527c).

⁷⁹ Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1275b for the political definition of a citizen: “he who has the power to take part in the deliberative and judicial administration of any πόλις <that is,... > a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life (ικανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς).” (trans. Barnes 1984). Cynicism attempted (with an avowed reluctance) to live up to this αὐτάρκεια, which in turn leads to a “happy life”.

⁸⁰ Dudley 1937.68 associates three Cynic ideals with individual Cynics who personify them best: αὐτάρκεια with Diogenes, φιλανθρωπία with Crates, and κοσμοπολίτης with Bion who was “the first real embodiment amongst the Cynics” of cosmopolitanism: “Bion, like the Sophists, travelled from city to city, and made prolonged stays at Rhodes and Pella.” The distinction pertains only to the actual *practice* of these ideals, since both Diogenes and Crates envisioned their cosmopolitanism mainly from Athens. Yet Dudley seems to forget Diogenes' frequent stays in Corinth, where his ideal would have been as relevant; still he is definitely right in saying that Bion became the prototype of “the vagrant preacher” who became an important figure in the Roman Empire.

⁸¹ It may be significant that Diogenes uses πολιτεία rather than πόλις, although Ehrenberg 1960.38 notes that the same word describes at once citizenship, the citizen body, and the constitution (*i.e.* the whole structure of the state).

mankind and it is as wide as the world, but Diogenes claims for himself a true membership to a particular πόλις, that is, “Cosmopolis”, a significant difference in my mind than the usual interpretation of the apophthegm.

This present interpretation complements Moles’ contribution to the issue and gives further support to his thesis that Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism has been wrongly perceived as a negative response to citizenship.⁸² Contrary to current scholarly opinion,⁸³ Moles successfully goes against the grain and paints, on the whole, a refreshing picture of Cynic cosmopolitanism by redressing the (modern) fault and underlining the *positive* aspects of the Cynic’s place in the world,⁸⁴ keeping in mind that “Diogenes’ polity was the most practical, the most universalist, and... the noblest of all

⁸² Although Cynicism often had negative conceptions, such as with freedom, its enterprise usually ended up constructing positive viewpoints. See Aune 2008.50, 63-64: “The Cynic emphasis on ἐλευθερία, however, is largely negative, as it is construed as freedom *from* various types of entanglements that are generically described with the umbrella metaphor of “slavery.” Cynicism is essentially a negative reaction to the social and cultural environment, but its proponents’ chief failure was to propose a program that would prove to be a positive counterpart to their criticism. [...] freedom from the slavery of a life governed κατὰ δόξαν (the customs and laws of culture), so as to live an unencumbered life κατὰ φύσιν (the self-evident design of nature), which is by definition ἐλευθερία”. Goulet-Cazé 1996.8 also distinguishes (negative) Cynic “freedom from” and (positive) “freedom to”.

⁸³ E.g. Dudley 1937.35 (recalling W. W. Tarn, “Alexander the Great and the Brotherhood of Man”, in *Proceedings of the British Academy* 19, 1932), Giannantoni 1990 Vol. 4: 537-547, Goulet-Cazé 1982 (in *RhM* 125: 229-231), and Schofield 1991 all see cosmopolitanism as “purely negative” (Moles 1996.106-107). Moles follows but a small group of scholars, e.g. Höistad 1948.141-143.

⁸⁴ Moles establishes that Diogenes’ views (DL 6.63, 72) are formulated in “positive” terms with the following as proofs (1996.109-110): κοσμοπολίτης vs ἄ-πολις, a “good government” exists vs “there is no good government”; the internationalist ideal is also parallel to other formulations by Heraclitus, Euripides, Antiphon, Hippias, Alcidamas, etc. (cf. 109n.18 for references); there remains an inherent paradox in Diogenes’ formulation as well as in thought: the restrictive meaning of “citizen”, exclusive to a πόλις, is in contrast with the extensive meaning of κόσμος, “the largest organism imaginable” (Moles 1996.110). Brown 2006, who also rejects the negative interpretation of cosmopolitanism, provides 2 reasons for its tradition: “First, a literal interpretation of world-citizenship is intelligible in negative terms, as a rejection of local citizenship, but seems to make no sense in positive terms in the absence of a world-state. Second, the origins of Hellenistic cosmopolitanism have traditionally been explained in a way that places its negative aspect front-and-center: it has been said that in the wake of Alexander the Great’s conquests the traditional πόλις collapsed and could not command the allegiance that it had once received.” At the same time that he shows that the representation of Socrates as himself a “cosmopolitan” (cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 5.108) is strictly seen in Stoic contexts, Brown 2006 struggles to claim that Diogenes’ *original* cosmopolitanism is nonetheless Socratic in tendency (550-552). The positive interpretation of Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism comes, for Brown, not in the Cynic’s explicit message (Diogenes famously rejected theory) but rather in his overall role as an educator of men (like Socrates): by providing his self as an exemplum for others to emulate the life according to nature, Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism necessarily needs to be perceived as a positive claim that is worth the discipline, if not the provocation.

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