

to read the “hieroglyphics” of this floating world (as Wharton noted of this symbolic confusion), together with the observer’s ability to maintain a relative independence from the object. “When you’ve lived as long as I you’ll see that every human being has his shell and that you must take that shell into account,” Merle concluded of this action,

“By the shell I mean the whole envelope of circumstances. There’s no such thing as an isolated man or woman; we’re each of us made up of some cluster of appurtenances. What shall we call our ‘self’? Where does it begin? Where does it end? It overflows into everything that belongs to us — and then it flows back again.”<sup>115</sup>

With this description, Merle not only alluded to the implications of society, who registered the symbolic value of this “envelope of circumstances” (“There’s no such thing as isolated man or woman”), but also to a proto-modern concern with the fragmented limits of subjectivity (“What shall we call our ‘self?’”). In contrast to Scott, who preferred to describe his unreliable memory in terms of an “extreme *dédoublement*” that suggested this spilt was reconcilable, Merle’s account of the sensation of overflowing — or seepage — referred to a more injurious inability to distinguish the boundaries between the object and self. (“Where does it begin? Where does it end? It overflows into everything that belongs to us — and then it flows back again.”) An indeterminacy, or enervating confusion, that not only spoke of a perverse reliance on these objects, which were assembled as “some cluster of appurtenances,” but also to the innate perversity of such objects.

The tenuous nature of this dynamic was best exemplified in the French writer J.K. Husymans’s Decadent classic *À rebours* (1884), in which its protagonist, Des Esseintes, effects an escape from the “stresses of society” by withdrawing from a world that had “fallen into idiocy or filthy pleasures [and] was perishing in the degeneracy of its members, whose faculties grew more debased with each succeeding generation.”<sup>116</sup> The character of Des Esseintes was famously based on the Parisian dandy, Robert de Montesquiou (1855-1921), whose poetry Berenson applauded and who also provided the inspiration for the Baron de Chalus in Proust’s *In Search of Lost Time*, and was immortalised by the American painter James MacNeill Whistler in his portrait, *Arrangement in Black and Gold: Comte Robert de Montesquiou-Fezensac* (1892). (Fascinatingly, Logan Pearsall Smith, Mary Berenson’s brother, substituted for Montesquiou during the “interminable process of painting” this portrait, as Whistler required a stand-in who could maintain an “aristocratic pose” with a heavy fur coat draped over one arm.<sup>117</sup>) Even among the indulgences of *fin-de-siècle* society, Montesquiou’s self-absorption was so renowned one wit quipped, “One expects more of a dead man” after the posthumous publication of his *Les Pas effacés: Mémoires* failed to scandalize the Parisian *demi-monde*.<sup>118</sup>

In addition to his writings, Montesquiou indulged his aestheticism by decorating the interior of his apartment with eccentrically themes, furnishing these rooms — as the writer Stéphane Mallarmé recalled — like a monastery cell, a yacht cabin, and a cathedral, complete with a Louis XIV

## Prologue

Indian jewellery is unique and its history as old as the history of the country itself. In India, jewellery for adornment is being used since centuries. If we talk about gold jewellery we find that several historical evidences have been found that Indian women wore gold jewellery every time: Bracelets, earrings, armlets, nose rings. The symbol of married status 'Mangalsutra' etc. all have been a part and parcel of Indian women, historically. During the Mughal period gold jewellery of India obtained its global touch and filigree work, embedding, enameling stones in gold got great popularity. In Orissa and Andhra Pradesh filigree jewellery is very popular.

Indian gold jewellery in global market is preferred and appreciated for its merits such as less maintenance, unique quality and fine polish etc. Gold jewellery used in India was the largest volume in the year 2008. The estimated consumption was 501.60 tonnes which was 23 per cent of world demand. Demand for gold jewellery has been increasing, inspite of increase in gold prices. (Exim Bank, 2010). According to Export Import Data Bank (EXIM Bank) Indian gold jewellery exports can be categorized in four products which contribute a lot in exports of total gems and jewellery. These four products are: (i) Jewellery of Gold Unset (ii) Jewellery of Gold Set with Pearls (iii) Jewellery of Gold Set with Diamond (iv) Jewellery of Gold Set with Precious and Semi Precious Stones other than Diamond. The jewellery of gold unset registered the highest growth rate, i.e., 29.443 per cent and with 2.089 per cent growth rate jewellery of gold set with pearls remained the lowest position among the all products of gold jewellery exports over the study period. India exports gold jewellery to various international markets such as Poland, Norway, the USA, the UK, Germany, Canada, Australia, Hong Kong, Italy and China etc. In recent years gold jewellery exports of India have increased because of huge demand in key markets and attractive offers by exporters towards latest designs and improved quality. Gold jewellery exporters have focused in this area and established new design training centers and manufacturing units to improve quality (Mukherjee, I., 2008). Poland remained the largest importer of Indian gold jewellery during the period from 2003-04 to 2013-14 and registered the highest Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 96.74 per cent followed by Malaysia (70.577 per

cent), Hong Kong (59.673 per cent), Oman (52.424 per cent), Nepal (38.897 per cent) and Norway (37.749 per cent) etc. Absolutely, these kinds of increasing trends of India's exports of gold jewellery have been showing a vast export potential in the sector of gem and jewellery as well as gold jewellery.

## Review of Literature

To fulfill the objectives of the study several research papers, books and studies were reviewed. Reddy, Y., V. (1996) discussed the role of gold in Indian economic system. Presenting the various features of India's gold economy he told that India has been known to possess huge stocks of gold and New Economic Policy (NEP) brought purchase and ownership of gold. According to the policy gold was allowed to be held only in the form of jewellery. He also presented his views on the gold control policy and discussed various issues. Desebrock, N. (2002) discussed India's gold jewellery exports to major markets, location of gold, jewellery exports fabrication and gold exports versus bullion usage for the period from 1991-92 to 2001-02. He indicates that the USA is the most important export market of India. It absorbs 55 per cent of the value of gold jewellery exports from India. Mukherjee, I. (2008) discussed quality, grades, caratage, finess and prices of gold. In addition, she illustrated various recent trends in gold jewellery, consumption and India's gold jewellery export performance in special reference to the USA for the period from 1998-99 to 2005-06. EXIM Bank (February, 2010) studied various issues related to gold and gold jewellery such as Indian gold consumption, trends in gold prices, production of gold, exports and imports of Indian gold jewellery etc. The bank also stated that India exports gold mainly in the form of jewellery maximum of them are studded with diamonds. World Gold Council (March, 2010) demonstrated that inspite of economic weakness and high gold prices India was the largest consumer of gold in the year 2008-09. Demand and supply drivers of gold provided a unique balance in the face of economic uncertainty and volatility. Diamond World (2010) demonstrated that gold jewellery exports from India have increased 9.38 per cent during the financial year 2009-10. ICRA (2013) presented the Indian gold Journal of International Economics jewellery demand trends in volume and value terms for the period from 2005-06 to 2012-13. It illustrated the growth percentage in both value and volume terms. World Gold Council (2014) analyzed the market and product structure and factors driving demand of jewellery in China. It studied that growth of jewellery in China has

civilised, too familiar” jewels in favor of “more startling and uncommon sorts,” before finally settling on a combination comprising “some real, some artificial” elements that sought to “produce a harmony, at once fascinating and disconcerting.”<sup>124</sup> Read in these terms, if decadence can be considered as a form of heightened (or overly aestheticized) artificiality, which runs “against nature,” then Scott’s “elegant and capricious” inclusion of the natural within the artificial — and with it the transit from the animate to the inanimate, together with the absorption of the disconcerting within the familiar — could only create a grotesque, which, like the baroque, gave voice spoke to the irrational.

### Geoffrey Scott and the ‘Humanism’ of Architecture

At the conclusion to his 1914 edition of *Architecture*, Scott again reiterated his conception of how architecture was ‘humanized’ through the observer’s psychosomatic inhabitation of space, with their “transcription of the body’s states into forms of buildings” not only constituting the “unique pleasure” of the “architectural art,” but also “presupposing a true and reliable experience.”<sup>125</sup> For Scott, the veracity of this exchange was most apparent in renaissance architecture, which he had argued throughout the volume gave a tangible form to an architectural ideal by “constructing, within the world as it is, a *pattern of the world*.”<sup>126</sup> In this way, this externalized ‘patterning’ was defined through the observer’s projection of their “emotive states” (or *einfulung*), which expressed an “our instinctual craving for order,” as “order is the pattern of the human mind.” With this unconscious order finding an analogue in the “intelligible” and “coherent” nature of architectural space, resulting in a subjective experience he argues “satisfies the desire of the mind” and “humanizes architecture.”<sup>127</sup> (As the neurasthenic collapses of Scott and Eliot suggest, however, this humanization was infinitely more complex and fragmentary than he allowed in the *Architecture of Humanism*.) The sense of order, proportion, and spatiality he read in renaissance architecture was conceived in relation to a system of rules and conventions that, however pliable in the hands of renaissance architects, was often explained in dispassionate — almost technical — terms in the renaissance architectural treatises Scott admired.

Naturally any such an explanation was antithetical to his own aesthetic concerns and, by contrast, he sought to provide a more definite description of the observer’s reactions to the art-work, rather than any explanation of the work itself. “The crisis in creative art,” he noted in his concluding section, “Art and Thought,” revealed “the need[,] the desire . . . for a more exact analysis of aesthetic experience.”<sup>128</sup> An exactitude he briefly suggested might be found in a “metaphysic of ‘Creative Evolution.’” Although unstated, Scott is obviously referring to Henri Bergson’s *Creative Evolution* (1907), in which the philosopher introduced the notion of *élan vital*, or the unconscious creative

impulse of society, rather than any evolutionary account of the development of architecture, which he had earlier rejected as the ‘biological fallacy.’ Scott’s understanding of Bergson’s work was indebted to his discussions with Karin Stephen, who had recently published her article, “What Bergson means by Interpenetration” (1912), and was in the process of writing her longer study, *The Misuse of the Mind: A Study of Bergson’s Attack on Intellectualism*, which was eventually published — with a brief preface by the philosopher — in 1922. As the historian John MacArthur has recently noted, however, Scott’s reference to Bergson’s notions of the *durée* and *élan vital* was not only brief, but also essentially ornamental, as it reaffirmed his conception of the observer’s animate movement through architectural space that he had drawn from Wölfflin and German empathy theory, rather than generating any substantive intellectual revision of these notions.<sup>129</sup>

In this way, this reference to ‘metaphysics’ illustrated Scott’s ambition of qualifying his aestheticism with a more objective and “exact analysis,” an awareness that was similarly apparent in Berenson’s use of Morellian scientific connoisseurship and Lee’s recourse to German empathy theory two decades earlier. His allusion to Bergson is only a passing reference, however, and his desire to correlate an orderly “human mind” with an equally rational architecture led Scott to suggest that the “modern science of psychology” afforded “the only means by which such an analysis can profitably be obtained.” As he noted,

“Without the acutely developed self-consciousness which that science implies, the final problems of criticism could neither be formulated nor attacked. For the problems of criticism rest, in the last resort, not on the external work of art objectively described, but on the character of our reaction to it — since it is this, and this alone, which determines its quality. Beauty, although by a natural instinct we make it a property of external things, is but a value of our own sensations. Of these the proper science is psychology.”<sup>130</sup>

Within the terms of this neo-Kantian assertion, Scott not only reaffirms the primacy of the subjective experience of architecture, which is defined through “the character of our reaction” to the art-work (rather than any external or objective qualities of that work), but also his endemic belief that “beauty” — or taste — “is but a value of our own sensations.” In this way, Scott subtly shifted the emphasis of this understanding from a psychosomatic conception of architectural space to a psychically invested inhabitation of it, embedded in memory and desire, which marked a shift from such theorists as Wölfflin, who had written to Lee to clarify that he thought any understanding of the art-work was primarily based on a physical response, rather than a psychical recollection.<sup>131</sup> As she noted, Lee was appreciative of Wölfflin’s clarification, as she appreciated that while “psychology teaches us that experience is subject to the memory,”<sup>132</sup> this memory is itself subject to a series of slips and lapses that expressed a less orderly “pattern of the mind” than Scott allowed.

Despite his insistence that psychology offered the appropriate scientific methodology to provide both a more detailed explanation of the observer’s psychical investment in space, Scott

pointedly omitted any reference to this “proper science” in the 1924 edition of *Architecture*. A deletion that, following the events of the intervening decade, can be attributed to two concerns. Firstly, it acknowledged how the psychosomatic explanation of the observer’s reception of the art-work, as expressed in Berenson’s notion of tactile-values and Lee’s exaggerated mimicry, had become progressively antiquated. (In contrast to such retrogressive sentiments, the Wölfflian inflicted theories offered by Siegfried Giedion in *Space, Time, Architecture*, 1941, and Pevsner in his *Pioneers of the Modern Movement*, 1936, and *Outline of European Architecture*, 1943, would be substantiated less by aesthetics, or science, than by their progressive understanding of how the historian’s “backward look” could transform contemporary existence.) Secondly, the ‘propriety’ of psychology, as Scott understood the science in terms of the pseudo-empiricist conceptions of William James (as mediated by Berenson) and Bergson (as discussed with Stephen), had been disassembled — if not actively perverted — by the psychoanalytical theories of Freud: ideas that Scott, like Berenson, considered specious.

Although psychology and psychoanalysis have distinct traditions, as Jacques Derrida has neatly surmised there is no psychology after psychoanalysis. (Which is to say, in the “psychoanalytical age there is no psychology” as there is no aspect of that science which remains untouched by Freudianism.<sup>133</sup>) In this way, Freud’s psychoanalytical conception of modern subjectivity — framed through his consideration of neurasthenia, the dream-work, and the psychical mechanism of forgetfulness — is not only vital here for the obvious complications it offers to Scott’s explanation of the “true and reliable experience” of architecture (and of reality itself), but also for its illustration of the transition from the connoisseurial observer, as personified by Scott and Berenson, to the fragmented modern subject. Read in these terms, Scott’s *Architecture* can be considered a kind of mnemonic, which describes “man’s life as a creature who sees and remembers what he has seen,” and an illustration of the movement toward what Mark Jarzombek has memorably described as “the psychologization of modernity.”<sup>134</sup> A psychologization based on the modernization of such anachronistic conditions as neurasthenia.

In his 1895 essay, “On the Grounds of Detaching a Particular Syndrome from Neurasthenia under the Description Anxiety-Neurosis,” Freud described how he derived his conception of anxiety from a reading of Beard’s account of nervous exhaustion. As he noted, this paper constituted a deliberate attempt to distinguish an “anxiety neurosis” from Beard’s broad definition of neurasthenia, which Freud considered overly vague and riddled with “pseudo-neurasthenias.” (“It is difficult to make any statement of general validity about neurasthenia,” he admitted, “so long as we use that name to cover all the things which Beard included under it.”<sup>135</sup>) As Freud interpreted the condition, neurasthenia was itself a symptom of proto-modernity, signaling — as it can be understood through the works of Scott and Berenson — the uneasy emergence of modern subjectivity. In contrast to

other psychical conditions such as hysteria, which originated in a single physical event, Freud argued anxiety was characterized by a sense of impending physical threat that was reified through the serial “accumulation of *somatic* excitement.” While the “*affect* of anxiety” is externalized in “a danger *approaching from outside*,” he explained, the “*neurosis* of anxiety . . . *reacts against a source of excitation which is internal*,” repressing those ungovernable desires while simultaneously projecting “*an analogous source of excitation which is external*.”<sup>136</sup> Viewed within the machinations of this mechanism, the disorderliness of the mind — together with the duplicitousness of the experience of those external excitations (or objects) — is obvious. Interestingly, while he noted neurasthenia was characterized by an “impoverishment of excitation” that was antipathetic to the anxious accumulation of excitement, Freud also suggested as the “precipitating cause” of both conditions “lies in the somatic field instead of the psychical one,”<sup>137</sup> neurasthenia and anxiety were often less distinct as clinical entities than coincidental. With the neurasthenic’s “becoming all nerves” providing a catalyst for the “unhappy relation to time and place” of the anxious modern subject.

Like Beard, Freud was unduly receptive to his patient’s hypochondria, which he recognized formed a kind of protective shield — a “wish to fall ill” — against the provocations of the external world and the emergence of internal desires, while also engendering a singular forgetfulness that meant the symptoms manifested simply “succeeded the symptoms of some other neuroses.”<sup>138</sup> (A cumulative succession that prefigured his later formulation of the screen-memory, in which the substitution of one memory with another was neither absolute nor legible, but rather superimposed and confused.) In this way, Freud argued none of these symptoms were “false,” but rather — like metaphors — constituted a progressively enervating allusion to something else. An allusion that further suggested, by extension, the manner in which such a “vague and uncertain” neurasthenic reading of architectural space — as offered by Scott’s anesthetized “dream of space” in his *Architecture of Humanism* — would not only tied to a hypochondriac “panoply of symptoms,” but also associated with an endemic forgetfulness. These neurasthenics live in “state of perpetual absentmindedness,” Proust and Ballet concluded of this process, with these “hypochondriacal preoccupations” resulting in a “power of recalling past events [that] is defective, because they are unable to sustain the mental effort necessitated by the search for the forgotten incident.”<sup>139</sup>

Intriguingly, the most sensible formulation of this ‘dream’ is not found in Scott’s writings, which are typically elusive in defining this ambition, but rather in Berenson’s solitary work on architecture, “A Word for Renaissance Churches” (1892). (A reference that further illustrates how the *Architecture of Humanism* was conceived in relation to — and should be considered as an extension of — Berenson’s aesthetic project.) In this article Berenson persistently restates his conviction that the “principal aim” of renaissance architecture was to manifest “perfect space, proportion, and order.”<sup>140</sup> In this ambition, these architects, as he continues,

“strove to produce an effect that would make one on entering a church feel the existence of a space as a positive fact, instead of a mere negation of solidity; as a material, not a void; and, beyond this, as a material capable of being shaped in the subtlest fashion. The moment you enter such a church as the Madonna della Consolazione at Todi — the best, although far from perfect, realization of the Renaissance ideal — you feel the as if you had cut loose from gravitation, and as if you took flight not only from the material universe, but also from all that is your conscious self.”<sup>141</sup>

Although he subsequently noted this nascent formulation was “crudely stated, undeveloped, and incomplete”<sup>142</sup> — especially in comparison to the refined definition of “space composition” he offered in his works on renaissance painting — the influence of Berenson’s brief “Word for Renaissance Churches” on Scott’s *Architecture* is evident in several ways. Firstly, in this description Berenson describes architectural space as a “positive fact” and subtly malleable “material” that is animated by inhabitation. For Scott, “The architect models in space as a sculptor in clay,” “He designs his space as a work of art” and, through an appeal to movement, “excites a certain mood in those who enter it.”<sup>143</sup> (Moreover, this formulation also acknowledges Wölfflin’s use of the same metaphor in explaining how the “hard, brittle stuff” of renaissance architecture “suddenly turned supple and soft” in the baroque, assuming the formal characteristics which “almost reminds us of clay.”<sup>144</sup>)

Secondly, Berenson also considered this excitation transmigrative, “as if you took flight not only from the material universe, but also from your conscious self,” with such an aesthetic idealization of architecture enacting a divorce from reality. In this way, his insistence on this “perfect effect of space” allowed Berenson to further assert renaissance architecture was almost solely concentrated “upon the interior.”<sup>145</sup> A primacy that would only be implied, rather than implicitly stated, by Scott. Thirdly, in this article Berenson sought to “deal with architecture from the point of view of the aesthetic spectator,” who was able to “enjoy it with the acuteness of a physical sensation,” retain “the remembrance of it,” and, “in reviving his emotion in tranquility,” sought to gain “a glimpse into the cause of his pleasure.”<sup>146</sup> In these terms, he not only prefigured the aesthetic impulse of Scott’s *Architecture*, but also dictated how the observer’s acknowledgment of this “ideal of space,” which reflected their “understanding of this law governing Italian architecture,” was a necessary precondition for their appreciation of renaissance architecture. Finally, in addition to dictating his methodology for the connoisseurship of architecture, Berenson’s contention that the Church of the Madonna della Consolazione provides “the realization of the beautiful dream of space”<sup>147</sup> haunted Scott’s conception of an aesthetically idealized architecture.

In his seminal *Interpretation of Dreams* (1899), Freud famously posited that such dreams constituted the primary object of the human unconscious. Although he acknowledged these dreams were typically a hastily arranged “conglomerate of psychic formations,” he argued the nonsensicality



of these formations could be disassembled through the process of interpretation and traced back to a pathological intent in the analysand's memory.<sup>148</sup> Despite these pathological impulses, Freud believed the dream was only able to represent desired images, however, with these emerging representations — which he likened to the development of a photograph — manifesting an imaginary potential through the presentation of a “state of affairs such as I might wish to exist.” In this way, the “*content of a dream*” represents both the “*fulfilment of a wish*” and an attempt to realize this fictitious state by creating a “pattern of the world” within the material world.<sup>149</sup>

Freud recognized the intrinsic positivism of this formulation, however, and he attempted to negate potential criticisms by suggesting the dream's latent content was distorted through the process of its conscious manifestation, with this representation evidencing a “means of disguise,” or “screen,” which the unconscious formed as a barrier between itself and the conscious material world.<sup>150</sup> Although the dream was ostensibly able to draw from any memories from the flow of the unconscious, it not only assumed a certain deliberateness in the selection of that material — “there are no indifferent dream stimuli, and therefore no guileless dreams,”<sup>151</sup> he noted — but also needed to confirm to the dictates of a representational legibility. That is, as these “dream-thoughts” (or desires) emerge they are translated by the dream-work into visual images, which are then projected onto the barrier between the conscious and unconscious, cast “as if a magic lantern threw the nerves in patterns on a screen.”

This screen was only a filament, however, a ‘thin film’ that the observer sought to drape over their body — like a silken coverlet, or an ornamented tortoise shell — in order to shield against the provocations of the material world. As the French psychoanalyst and writer Jean-Bertrand Pontalis has subsequently argued, Freud's conception of the dream-work falsely posits the possibility of “being able to reach that mythical place where nothing is disjointed, where the real is imaginary and the imaginary real.” And it is in the sustenance of this illusion, as he further argues, reconceptualising the Freudian dream-work, that “the dream strives for permanence, for a suspension of the wish and not for the achievement of a satisfaction; in this case, the object of the wish would be the *wish itself*.”<sup>152</sup> That is, instead of manifesting these unconscious desires, the dream-work acts to suspend these ambitions within the precarious interiority of the dream, held — as it were — within the passing moment of a beautiful leisure. In this way, the subject's relation to the material object seeks a kind of psychical preservation of the self through the negotiation of these desires, with the taxing nature of this exchange doubly illustrating the efforts of attempting to fulfill an “imaginary potential” and adhere to a conscious legibility. And Freud's conception of the dream-work encompasses both the pliancy of objects, which are “supple and soft . . . like clay,” and the fundamental mischievousness of the dreamer's unconscious.<sup>153</sup> Such a “beautiful dream of space” was not only capable of expressing desire, however, but also — as Freud's colleague Sándor Ferencsi (1873-1933)

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